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1 Introduction
This paper explores the dynamics of income convergence and the flow out of poverty of Indian rural households, 1994-2005 . The concept of convergence has been typically used to evaluate inequalities among incomes of different countries or regions with aggregated data. Recent research, however, has used household data as well, which allows for a broader perspective of convergence. Ravallion (2012) uses household data to study not only income but also poverty convergence among 100 developing countries. He claims that income convergence should lead to poverty convergence: poorer families grow faster and catch-up in terms of their incomes, which makes them less poor and thus they also catch-up with respect to their poverty levels with higher proportionate rates of poverty reduction. Nevertheless he finds that there is income but not poverty convergence under the argument that poverty itself restricts poverty convergence, also known as " poverty traps".
In this context, India is a country characterised by its high growth rates but also by its widespread inequalities, hinting at the possibility of the presence of poverty traps. India's high growth rates are attributed to its liberalisation reforms undertaken since the 1990s, which are associated with an expansion of capital and skill-intensive exports (e.g. software and business services, pharmaceuticals, vehicles, auto parts, and steel, among others). This pattern of development contrasts sharply with the Chinese case which has been more manufacturingcentred (Bardhan, 2007) .
The kind of development path which India has followed seems to have been mainly benefited the urban sectors up to now, and in fact, earlier research has shown that the liberalisation 3 process exacerbated regional disparities between urban and rural areas (Deaton and Dreze, 2002) . Thus, despite the strong economic growth that India has experienced, the results for welfare have not been successful (Deaton and Dreze, 2002) . Recent studies show that the poverty decline in India has been slower than in other LDCs (Lenagala and Ram, 2010) 1 . The main explanation seems to be the nature of the development path, which has benefited mostly high-skilled people that live in urban areas rather than the majority of people who live in the rural areas and work in the agricultural sector (Cain et al., 2010) . In China and other Asian countries, on the other hand, the manufacturing-intensive growth pattern adopted there benefited a much larger share of the population (Kotwal et al., 2011) .
Over time, however, the process of liberalisation may have generated some positive externalities for rural areas. Kotwal et al. (2011) mentions that a major contribution of the liberalisation process to agricultural growth is likely to be a diversification effect as rising incomes lead to greater urban demand for higher-valued edible oils, milk, fruits and vegetables than staple food cereals in the longer run. Another positive spillover acts through remittances to rural households from family members migrating to urban areas (Parida and Madheswaran, 2010) .
Traditionally, inequality has been linked to the rigid stratification of Indian society according to caste and socioreligious background 2 . In fact, both Singh (2010) and Desai and Dubey (2011) find that the caste system generates inequalities. Singh (2010) decomposes net farm income inequality and finds that caste explains a substantial part of it. Similarly, Desai and Dubey (2011) find persistent caste disparities in education, income, and social networks. 4 Other research shows, however, that intergenerational social mobility can occur despite the caste system. Hnatkovska et al. (2013) use the household level National Sample Survey (NSSO) data from to examine the economic progress of sons compared to their fathers in terms of income, education, and occupation. They find that when comparing the most disadvantaged groups, namely the Dalits (SCs) and Adivasis (STs) to the most advantaged, there is significant intergenerational mobility in all of these dimensions, including significant occupational upgrading by sons as compared to their fathers. Examining a longer time-period Azam and Bhatt (2012) find that there has been significant improvement in educational mobility across generations in India (since the 1940s) at the aggregate level, across social groups, and across states.
As a result, several questions arise, what has happened in welfare terms in rural areas in the decade following liberalisation? Are rural households worse off in terms of income inequality and poverty reduction or did they actually benefit from the liberalisation process? Are there signs of poverty traps? What is the role of socioreligious grouping, if any?
Two earlier papers have attempted to answer some of these questions. A recent article by Jha et al. (2013) models the vulnerability to poverty by using panel data for rural India for the period 1999-2006 (3,628 observations in both years). They find evidence for the existence of a poverty trap in the sense that ex ante vulnerability of being poor in 1999 translates into ex post poverty in 2006. Instead, we use a much larger data set and compare income to poverty outcomes. On the other hand, Krishna and Shariff (2011) examine the same data studied here and compare those households that exit poverty to the ones that enter poverty, treating them as 5 two different independent samples. We do not split the sample, rather we use the whole sample for our calculations.
We intend to answer all the questions raised above, by using a unique panel data set of Indian rural households (more than 13,000 households) observed during 1993-1994 and 2004-2005 . This allows us to trace economic welfare over time in the rural sector, paying particular heed to how vulnerable low caste and religious minority households have fared over time compared to the high castes. Thus, we are able to provide rich micro-data based evidence on the longer run effects of liberalisation at the level of the household taking the dynamics into account in a conditional analysis.
We assess inequalities and poverty traps, by studying poverty transitions and income convergence, which take into account the potential effect of initial conditions on catching-up in income/exiting poverty. Simultaneously we establish the main income growth determinants at the household level as well as the determinants of poverty outcomes. We focus on the role of caste (separating Dalits, Adivasis, OBCs and High-castes) but also on the role of religion. According to the 2006 Sachar Committee Report, Muslims are also a disadvantaged group in India, and there is no reservation policy 3 for this group currently. Moreover, we explore whether we capture different welfare concepts when using a continuous variable for income as compared to the binary variable for poverty.
The paper is organised as follows. We first describe the dataset and the most important variables in our models. Then we present our empirical strategy. After that we discuss our findings and finally, we present the conclusions, discuss policy implications, and provide suggestions for future research. Human Development Survey (IHDS)" collected information for a total of 41,554 households situated both in rural and urban areas; this survey was conducted by NCAER and the University of Maryland (Desai et al., 2009) . From the first survey, a random sample was selected to be reinterviewed in the second survey. However, the original 1993-1994 survey was not randomly selected. With that concern, a new random sample was chosen from rural areas to be compared to the re-interviewed sample in order to determine whether the re-interviewed sample was overrepresented among certain segments of the society. The comparisons suggest that on most variables of interest such as caste, religion, education, and economic status, the re-interviewed sample does not differ substantially from the fresh sample (see Table 1 ).
The re-interviewed sample consists of a total of 13,081 households, from which 82%, or 10,791 households, were contactable for re-interview and the rest, 2,290 households, had separated from the original household but were still living in the same village, so they were contacted for an interview, as well.
( In 2005, some households from our sample reported negative incomes, more specifically, farming income. These households reported crop failures and high farm expenses. The survey designers confirm that the negative numbers are correct but they advise working with positive incomes higher than 1000 Rs (Desai and Vanneman, 2008) . Therefore, our sample is reduced to 12,352 households. In terms of the household composition in our sample, 59% are adults, 7%
older people and 34% are children. As much as 95% of household heads are male and 60% of them are below 30 years of age, 52% are illiterate and 48% are engaged in agriculture (additional descriptive statistics can be found in Table A .1 in the Appendix). This is a sign of increasing inequality, since it implies that the distribution became more unequal over time. However, we have to remember that these are the unconditional distributions without controlling for other factors.
As for income, also the standard deviation of consumption expenditure has increased from 1994 to 2005. Figure (1) shows the distribution of food consumption as compared to income.
As expected, the distribution of food consumption is narrower, since people tend to fulfil their food needs first 5 .
( Figure 1 here) According to our population estimates of poverty incorporating IHDS design weights, poverty has increased from 37% in 1994 to 41% in 2005 (see Table 2 ). This does not mean that all households were worse off in 2005 compared to 1994. For example, about 22% of the households managed to leave poverty, and 41% stayed non poor. The results are driven by those that entered poverty, 18%, and by those 19% that remained poor throughout the entire period.
Note that the finding of a poverty increase over this period is not unusual (Deaton and Kozel, 2005) .
( Table 2 here ) We can also examine poverty flows in terms of socioreligious group. The Brahmin and
Forward castes (jointly denoted as High caste) had greater positive outcomes than negative ones:
56% remained non poor and 19% left poverty. The minorities had a similar pattern: 10 63% stayed non poor and 14% left poverty. In contrast, 32% of the Adivasis entered poverty, and 22% stayed poor. The numbers are similar for the Dalits and Muslims (Table 3 ).
( Table 3 here)
In regional terms we also have contrasting outcomes. The Northern, Western and Southern regions perform better than the rest of the regions. For example, 56% of the households in the Northern region remain non poor in both years, while in the Upper Central Region, only 32% are non-poor in both years.
3 Empirical strategy
Income convergence
We study the dynamics of income by examining income growth and its determinants by considering the following equation:
where g y i is the annual growth rate of income of household i during the period 0 to τ ; y 0 i is the income at the beginning of the period measured in logarithms; the vector x i includes a constant and all the controls (education, occupation, caste, gender and age of the head plus age composition of the household, assets, state dummies and the split dummy to control for the households that split from the first survey). Finally ε y is the error term and is assumed to be normally distributed.
The coefficient β y measures the relationship between initial income and growth, after controlling for household and geographic characteristics. When β y is negative, the poorer the household the more it will grow in comparison to the richer households, holding everything else constant.
Some of the explanatory variables in Equation (1) are predetermined, such as caste, gender and age of the head of the household. However, other variables such as occupation and education of the head may be simultaneously determined or create some reverse causation with respect to income growth. Therefore, in order to avoid simultaneous relations, we include all our explanatory variables observed at the beginning of the period 10 .
On the other hand, we know that our income variable has potential measurement error problems. Measurement error in self-reported surveys is well known and documented. It may be that the persons interviewed are not able to report the precise value of income. One could argue that the misreport is caused by age, education, or some other characteristic of the individual being interviewed, which will necessarily introduce a bias (specifically, attenuation bias, see Wooldridge, 2002) . Additionally, measurement error is also a potential concern for rural households, for which it is potentially difficult to derive an accurate report of the value of produce 12 from subsistence farming. Many studies argue for using household expenditures instead of household income as the measure of welfare. The reasons for this are several. First, expenditures are measured more accurately than income (Glewwe, 1991) as it is easier to recall expenditures on consumption than income. Second, following the permanent income hypothesis, it may reflect longer term economic status better (Appleton, 2001 ). If we see a similar convergence pattern employing consumption, we are more convinced that is not just a transitory shock that is driving the finding. This is especially the case if additionally stratifying by caste and religion produces similar results. Therefore, we use a subset of household expenditures as a proxy for income and estimate our growth equation in terms of consumption expenditure as well,
which is identical to (1) , except that instead of household income, y, we are now modelling household consumption, c.
Poverty flows
To confirm our results on income convergence, we estimate a model of poverty transition 11 .
Since our poverty measure is a binary variable we choose not to work with a growth model because its interpretation is not as straightforward. Instead we choose to work with probit models, which yield more intuitive results, in terms of poverty probabilities 12 . We start with a 13 simple probit model that accounts for initial poverty status as an explanatory variable for final poverty status,
where p τ i is our poverty dummy variable, being 1 when poor (below the poverty line) and 0 when non-poor in the last year of the period, and p 0 i is the poverty dummy variable in the initial year. As before, the vector x i includes a constant and all the controls.
We also estimate a recursive biprobit model 13 , where initial poverty status becomes endogenous and is determined by the same explanatory variables plus land,
where ρ is the correlation coefficient of the unobservables of each of the equations. The objective is to account for the correlation between the error terms of the two individual 14 equations and, thus, to infer the importance and direction of the unobservables as drivers of the two individual equations/poverty statuses in the two periods. In comparison to the normal probit model, the bivariate probit analyses can yield useful estimates such as conditional probabilities (e.g., the probability of being non poor in 2005 given that one was poor in 1994).
For identification purposes, we restrict the variable land to enter only through the initial poverty variable due to its pre-determinedness. This approach in fact resembles an IV procedure where land is the instrument for initial poverty. We discuss the assumption of having land ownership as instrument in Section 4.1.1.
We compare poverty outcomes given equal initial conditions. There is a flow out of poverty when the probability of ending non-poor is higher than ending poor in 2005 given that one was poor in 1 9 9 4 14 :
4 Results Table 4 reports the estimated results from Equations (1) and (2) in columns 1 and 2 respectively.
Income convergence
We first analyse the determinants of income/consumption growth and later we analyse the convergence parameters.
For both income and consumption growth, education is very important. The education coefficients are higher for income than consumption. All socioreligious groups, compared to high 15 caste, appear to have both statistically and substantively significant negative effects on income and consumption growth, except for minorities. Again, the importance of socioreligious grouping is more negative for income than consumption, and the worst off are Muslims. In a similar fashion assets seem to have a higher impact on income than consumption. None of the occupations, in comparison to an occupation in agriculture, are important for food consumption while all of them are important for income, especially when the head of the household owns his or her own business. In contrast, the household's annual expenditures on education seem to be relevant only for income growth.
( Table 4 here)
Regarding the beta convergence coefficients, they are very similar, β y = 7.6% and β c = 7.9%, and imply a half-life of 9 years, see Table A .3. The fact that both speeds of convergence are so similar can hint at two different things. First, that measurement error in income is not as bad as expected so that food consumption is a good proxy for income. Or, second, that there is measurement error both in initial income and in consumption compared to the final outcomes, which when captured by the β parameter makes the speeds of convergence similar.
Furthermore, measurement error in the initial variable can lead to high speeds of convergence.
For example, when initial income is below its true value, the growth rate will appear higher than it should be, showing convergence. Therefore, we now examine the second possibility. 16 
Sensitivity analysis
Initial income may be endogenously determined because the measurement error that it may contain may be related to the error term in the growth model since initial income enters also in the RHS. We re-write Equation 1 in levels
Equation (5) can be estimated instead of Equation (1) without loss of generality, the only difference is that the parameters are scaled in a different way. We recover the original growth parameters by dividing by τ , except the y 0 parameter, which needs to be subtracted by one and then divided by τ .
Then we instrument our potentially endogenous variable, initial income, with land ownership. Land ownership is often inherited and therefore exogenously determined (Glewwe, 1991) . The land market in India is very tight or even almost non-existent due to inheritance and ownership rules 16 . Morris (2002) points out that the land markets are highly distorted and inefficient; land records are inaccurate, outdated, and incomprehensible and transaction costs are high by international standards, all of which have discouraged formal land transactions.
We suggest that it is reasonable to assume that land ownership is exogenous to income growth, that it is predetermined and cannot, therefore, be simultaneously determined with income growth. However, it could be related to growth through unobservable variables such as 17 changes in international food prices. An increase in food prices, while keeping land constant, increases household income. In our case, a change in international food prices between our two points in time would be the same for all households. Therefore, we suggest that this is captured by the constant. Another possible omitted variable could be land efficiency which we suggest is captured by our asset variable which includes productive assets. However, of course we realise that ultimately land matters for income. Therefore we also assume that land is related to initial income rather than to growth, which implies that land explains growth only via initial income 17 .
The results are shown in Table 5 and column 3 shows the re-calculated growth parameters.
Regarding the determinants of income growth, we can see that after using our instrument, the impact of the most important determinants has decreased a bit. However the same variables are still statistically significant. Surprisingly the β y remains close to the previous results: β y = 6.9% 18 . Therefore, we are confident that our previous results are robust, especially given that no other instrument is available. It is worth noting that the exogeneity tests indicate that initial income is indeed exogenous (see Table A. 3).
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( Table 5 here)
Poverty flows
Next, we examine the results of our probit and biprobit models (Equations (3) and (4), respectively). In the first case, initial poverty is restricted to be exogenous and in the second case, 18 initial poverty is allowed to be endogenous. In both cases, the original estimations are presented in the Appendix (Table A. 4) . It is not intuitive to interpret the coefficients from Table   A .4 directly. Therefore, we calculate the average marginal effects. For the probit case the average marginal effect of each explanatory variable is evaluated at the outcome of Pr (poor2005=1) while for the biprobit case, the average marginal effect is evaluated at the conditional probability of Pr(poor2005=1| poor1994=1), which we call "conditional probability of poverty". We choose to work with conditional probabilities instead of joint probabilities because they resemble regression coefficients by showing the effect of different explanatory variables of the conditional mean, i.e. slopes of conditional expectations (Greene, 2008) . The results are shown in Table 6 .
( Table 6 here)
The estimated parameters are very similar for both probit and biprobit models. Actually the Wald test of ρ, that indicates whether the correlation of unobservables is zero, suggests that we should accept the null (last line in Table A .4) . However, we still continue with the biprobit analysis in order to obtain the conditional probabilities. In the end, the results are not wrong, and imply just that we are using a more general model than needed as it takes into account the potential correlation of unobservables and the potential influence of land ownership.
Regarding the determinants of the conditional probability of remaining in poverty, we find that primary and middle education levels reduce such a probability. Regarding occupation, professional and own business jobs lower such a probability too. Being from OBC, SC, ST or 19 being Muslim increases the conditional probability of poverty, with the Muslims faring the worst. Further, Table 7 shows the joint and conditional predicted probabilities for the total sample, for each of the socioreligious groups and regions.
( Table 7 here)
We suggest that it is potentially interesting to examine the conditional probability of exiting poverty, Pr(poor2005=0 | poor1994=1). The joint probability instead, Pr(poor2005=0, poor1994=1) is just indicative but not as interesting in our case. To make our point, we can see that the joint probability of exiting poverty is 20% and by socioreligious group, it looks like the most disadvantaged groups (Dalit, Adivasi and Muslim) have a higher probability of exiting poverty (24%, 22% and 22%, respectively). However, if we consider instead the conditional probability of exiting poverty, we see that for the total sample, it is 63%. By examining the estimated probabilities by socioreligious group, we see that the High caste and minorities have the highest conditional probabilities of exiting poverty (75% and 86%, respectively). Thus the conditional probability is taking into account the previous state of poverty, which, we argue, is the correct thing to do when allowing for the existence of poverty traps.
Considering regional variation, the conditional probability of exiting poverty is highest for the Northern (78%) and for the Southern region (73%). By contrast it is lowest for the Upper Central (54%) region. Similarly the conditional probability of staying non-poor, Pr(poor2005=0 | poor1994=0), is the highest for the Northern (75%) and Southern (70%).
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Regarding our poverty results, when conditioned on initial poverty, the probability of ending non-poor is higher than ending poor:
We find the same relation within all socioreligious groups, namely that the probability of exiting is higher than the probability of remaining in poverty. However for the Adivasis and
Muslims the difference is not as high. In general, we find no evidence of poverty traps and instead we find that poverty is declining and, thus, the poor will not stay poor.
Discussion

Comparison with previous research
The main difference between our analysis and that in Krishna and Shariff (2011) is that even though they separate their sample by the household's poverty situation in 1994, it is not the same as conditioning on the initial poverty status (as we do). They essentially re-sample their analysis. First, they choose those households that were poor in 1994 and non-poor in 2005 and then they choose households that were not poor in 1994 and poor in 2005. Instead we work with the whole sample and with conditional outcomes. Regarding the explanatory variables, they include community characteristics, and we do not, out of a concern for endogeneity due to 21 location choice. Plus, they include variables from 2005, which we try to avoid due to potential simultaneity.
Although the methodology in Jha et al. (2013) is very different, we try to compare our findings with some of their results. To begin with, they measure the vulnerability of being poor as the probability of entering poverty and staying poor. Later, they include their vulnerability measure in their initial year in a multinomial logit to obtain outcomes of different combinations.
From all those results combined we think the result that is most comparable to our conditional probability would be the poor-poor result. They find that education is very important just as we do. However, the other variables are defined differently and hence difficult to compare.
Migration
In the introduction we mentioned that although rural India has not gained from the skill biased pattern of development since the 1990s, studies show that the rural sector has indirectly benefited from rural-urban migration, in particular, from remittances. Data from the NSSO 64th
round (2007) (2008) show that the average yearly consumption expenditures for rural households receiving remittances was Rs. 41,000 as compared to Rs. 38,000 for rural households not receiving remittances, and that 36.5% of rural households received such remittances (Parida and Madheswaran, 2010) . Remittances, therefore, are an important source of income and consumption-smoothing for certain rural households and this may have had consequences for rural incomes and poverty in recent years.
Unfortunately our sample of households only includes those families who have actually stayed in the rural areas in the period under study. This means that our sample is restricted to 22 the households that have not migrated. However, one or more family members may have migrated.
We do not have information on whether or not a member has migrated in 1994 but our total household income measure includes remittances in any case.
In the literature migrants are generally found to be positively self-selected in terms of both observables and unobservables. However, their economic performance after migration could vary depending on job availability in urban areas and many could actually be worse-off after migrating if they do not possess the skills demanded in urban labour markets in India which have experienced skill-biased technological change in recent times. Therefore the potential selection bias could go in either direction.
A drawback of our data is that we cannot separate remittances from the total income in the Despite the fact that the raw data shows increasing inequality in income and increased poverty rates over this period, we find that there is evidence of income and poverty convergence which indicates that poverty traps are escapable and that poor households are indeed catching up to the rich households.
Among the most important results we find that education, occupation (in particular selfemployment) and asset ownership are crucial for income accumulation and also for poverty reduction. One policy recommendation would be to provide access to productive assets to families and at the same time increase public expenditures on education in rural areas, perhaps emphasizing training in usage of such assets to promote entrepreneurship.
Another robust finding running through income to poverty convergence is that the lower castes (Dalits and Adivasis as well as OBCs) as well as Muslims, show less income growth and slower poverty convergence than the High castes and Minorities. This is the case despite decades of reservation policies for Dalits and Adivasis, suggesting that these groups require further attention in future inequality reducing measures and so do OBCs and Muslims.
Extensions could consider incorporating the effects of migration and searching for alternative instruments (within the confines of the previously mentioned issues regarding these issues). In the future the survey will be conducted again which will allow us to exploit one more wave of data to confirm our currents results on income convergence and poverty transition for households in rural India. Note: Flows are calculated as shares of the total samples of each group (Obs.in mill). Design weights are used to get population estimates. Note: Standard errors allow for intra-village correlation. Coefficients for states are ommitted. ***: statistically significant at 1%; **: statistically significant at 5%; *:statistically significant at 10%; ++: statistically significant at 15%; +: statistically significant at 20%. Note: Standard errors allow for intra-village correlation. Coefficients for states are ommitted. ***: statistically significant at 1%; **: statistically significant at 5%; *:statistically significant at 10%; ++: statistically significant at 15%; +: statistically significant at 20%. 
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